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Abstract 
 
The differences in the way climate change mitigation projects are facilitated 
under the Kyoto Protocol as compared to the financial mechanism of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) demonstrate 
institutional change processes that evolved from global climate change 
negotiations.  Institutional change happens when new practices become 
accepted and interactions between organizations carry new meanings.  Models 
of the two policy options are presented in this paper depicting organizational 
interactions to demonstrate the evolution of rule-setting in this arena.  A 
discussion of power implications is provided with the conclusion that countries of 
the North as well as business corporations have increased their influence in the 
institutional framework of international climate change mitigation.  Institutional 
theory needs to be further developed to be able to explain the dynamic changes 
that led to this shift in power potential.  
 
Introduction 
 
Although the sociological roots of institutional theory are clearly intertwined with 
reflections on power (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Giddens, 1984; Jaffee, 2001), 
a consideration of power inequalities in the process of institutionalization has only 
recently resurfaced in the arguments of institutional theorists (Greenwood and 
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Hinings, 1996).  Power differentials in an organizational field have to be made 
explicit and taken into account when describing the process of institutionalization.   
An organizational field cannot be assumed to operate democratically.  Sources of 
power, symbols of power and types of power (Pfeffer, 1981) have to be 
considered to make an analysis of institutionalization complete.  The notion of 
power as potential capability to use resources in such a way as to enhance one’s 
own position (Bacharach and Lawler, 1998) needs to be reintegrated into the 
arguments of institutional theorists.  When we explicitly recognize that power 
struggles occur within the organization as well as across organizations to form 
institutionalized structures, we can use institutional theory to help explain how 
power is distributed and utilized in an organizational field and where power 
struggles occur.  
 
Institutional theorists describe three triggers for institutional change (Greenwood, 
Hinings and Suddaby, 2002):  social upheaval, regulatory change and 
technological disruptions.  This theoretical consideration can be extended to 
construct three dimensions of the organizational field where power struggles may 
bring about institutional change: the societal, policy and project arenas.  Meyer 
and Rowan (1977) discuss how organizations may display a legitimizing 
ceremonial front that represents their formal organization (policy arena) yet act 
differently within their informal organization on daily activities (project arena) in 
order to gain efficiency in their operations.  Outcomes from both arenas are 
measured against the beliefs and values developed in the societal dimension of 
the organizational field. 
 
To portray the functioning of power struggles within the boundaries of the arenas 
developed in this paper, I draw on the example of the international funding 
mechanism for climate change mitigation projects, i.e. the way climate-friendly 
technology is transferred to developing countries.  The account details the 
emergence of a competing proto-institution (Lawrence et al., 2002).  The paper 
examines the shift in power differentials between actors in order to determine 
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who has an interest in bringing about this institutional change.  
Interorganizational relations cannot be understood without examining the context 
in terms of power differentials. 
 
The paper is divided into four main sections.  The theoretical context of this study 
will be outlined, followed by an explanation of why and how the climate change 
mitigation regime was used to demonstrate power struggles in the policy arena.  
The empirical study is then discussed and general implications are drawn.  The 
article concludes with a call to research power relations at all three levels in more 
depth. 
 
Theoretical context 
 
Institutional theorists have been accused of sidestepping a discussion of how 
institutions change in favour of analyzing how they maintain stability (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Oliver, 1991).  Clearly, it is 
paramount to point out that institutions encourage order in a society by shaping 
human interaction in social, economic and political life (Farjoun, 2002).  
Nevertheless, fascinating aspects of institutions become apparent once one 
dispels their taken-for-grantedness and opens the discussion on how 
institutionalized routines change over time.  DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991) call for 
institutional theorists to dedicate more research into issues such as change and 
power has produced a strong response from the scholastic community.  Many 
authors have since tackled certain aspects of institutional change: institutional 
entrepreneurship using institutional strategies (Lawrence, 1999; Oliver, 1991) or 
interorganizational collaboration (Hardy and Phillips, 1998; Lawrence et al., 
2002), institutional development in turbulent organizational fields (Farjoun, 2002), 
and radical organizational change (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996) to name a 
few.  Despite all this effort the examination of change from an institutional theory 
angle has only just begun (Hensmans, 2003). 
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Institutions as the central theme have been defined as “procedures, practices, 
and their accompanied shared meanings enacted and perceived by members” 
(Zilber, 2002: 234).  Although they were created through social interaction of 
actors, institutions have reached a level of taken-for-grantedness that allows an 
action within an institution to be much less costly to the actor than an action 
outside of the institutional framework (Barely and Tolbert, 1997; Lawrence, Hardy 
and Phillips, 2002; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987).  Initially, institutional 
theorists discussed institutional pressures toward conformity that were exerted 
mainly from the surroundings of an organization (Barley and Tolbert, 1997).  
Since then, institutionalization has also been examined looking at the 
organization as the source of institutional pressures (Zucker, 1987).  
Organizations thus are not only exposed to external pressures, they also 
exercise power over the institutional framework through institutional strategies 
(Oliver, 1991; Lawrence, 1999).  This balance essentially forms the inherent 
duality Barley and Tolbert discuss: “institutions […] both arise from and constrain 
social action” (1997: 95).   
 
Institutional pressures can be interpreted as power exerted by members of an 
organizational field on other members.  An organizational field is defined by 
institutional theorists as a “community of organizations that partakes of a 
common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently and 
fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott, 1995: 56).  
Hoffman (1999) adds to this discussion that the field is formed around a common 
issue rather than a common product or market.  The power structure in such an 
organizational field cannot be assumed to be democratic but has instead been 
described as an institutional war (Hoffman, 2001).  Although organizations can 
use entrepreneurial strategies to change their institutional context (Lawrence 
1999), institutional practices can also deliberately remain resistant to change 
when the current environment is beneficial to powerful agents (Beckert, 1999).   
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Institutionalization is the process that sees a new set of routines and practices 
become taken-for-granted and entrenched.  Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips (2002) 
call this emerging system a proto-institution.  They explain: “These new 
practices, technologies, and rules are institutions in the making: they have the 
potential to become full-fledged institutions if social processes develop that 
entrench them and they are diffused throughout an institutional field.” (2002: 
283).    
 
A new set of institutionalized routines will change the organizational landscape.  
According to Fligstein (1991) institutional change occurs either when power 
relations shift in an organizational field or when the goals of powerful actors 
change.  Greenwood and Hinings (1996) add to this analysis that those actors in 
position of power can enable or suppress radical change.  Institutional change is 
intertwined with the notion of power.  In order to understand institutional change, 
power relations have to be made explicit and central in the analysis of 
interorganizational relations. 
 
Power can be defined as the “capability or potential that may or may not be used 
by actors and, if used, may or may not be effective” (Bacharach and Lawler, 
1998).  It is therefore not only merely a resource in itself but rather the utilization 
of resources.  Power is a strategy rather than a property (Foucault, 1979).  
Resources are the vehicle through which power is exercised to reproduce 
structures of domination (Giddens, 1979).  Organizations in a field can exert 
power on each other depending on the type and amount of resources they can 
manipulate and how effective they are in this utilization.  This also means that 
power resides in the relationship between actors rather than within actors 
themselves (Hatch, 1997).  
 
The distribution of power that exists in an organizational field therefore has to be 
analyzed within the social relationships of institutional actors.  Pfeffer (1981) 
cautions that the notion of power can become a tautology if it is used to explain 
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everything.  Instead, Pfeffer notes that “A person is not ‘powerful’ or ‘powerless’ 
in general but only with respect to other social actors in a specific social 
relationship.” (1981: 3).  To establish the existence of power relations and 
dependencies, the actors have to be studied in the context of the institution that 
they act within (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).  In the context of the climate 
change policy regime, power is measured as influence over the policy process.   
 
How power relations affect the dynamics in an organizational field becomes 
apparent when institutional structures change.  When a proto-institution 
(Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips, 2002) emerges, power dependencies shift and 
offer a unique opportunity to study the influence of various actors.  The 
discussion surrounding climate change mitigation projects in developing 
countries governed by international treaties bears witness to the emergence of 
such a proto-institution.  The way renewable energy projects are funded is about 
to change drastically through the provisions of the Clean Development 
Mechanism as outlined in the Kyoto Protocol.  This context gives us an 
opportunity to begin to see institutional change in the light of power differentials.   
 
Methodology 
 
The international climate change policy context was chosen to analyse global 
rule-setting for three distinct reasons.  Firstly, choosing this case study is a 
response to a social concern and of utmost importance in international policy 
efforts.  “Social science should be guided by problems of life and practice rather 
than by intellectually self-generated conceptions and techniques.” (Selznick, 
1996: 270)  It is grounded in the economic, social and political life of the global 
community.   
 
Secondly, the context provides a well-documented, highly-institutionalized 
interplay of organizations.  Documents of official texts and decisions are publicly 
available in at least three languages (English, French and Spanish), making them 
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accessible to a wide-ranging audience.  Lists of organizations participating in the 
policy process are also publicly available.  Meyer and Rowan discuss the degree 
to which an organizational environment is institutionalized:  “Societies that, 
through nation building and state formation, have developed rational-legal orders 
are especially prone to give collective (legal) authority to institutions which 
legitimate particular organizational structures.  […] The stronger the rational-legal 
order, the greater the extent to which rationalized rules and procedures and 
personnel become institutional requirements.” (1977: 347, 348). 
 
Thirdly, the group of actors is particularly diverse, adding to the complexity of the 
organizational field.  Participants include representatives of governments of 
almost all of the world’s states, members of intergovernmental organizations, 
corporate managers, environmentalists, and researchers from an array of 
disciplines.  Despite this diversity, however, all actors are grouped into 
organizations.  Every individual who wants to enter the grounds where the 
negotiations take place has to be a member of an approved organization.  
Democratically elected or not, country representatives have the legitimate power 
to set up new institutional arrangements.   
 
The following account demonstrates the emergence of a competing institution in 
an institutional field.  The discussion will focus on the overlap of climate change 
policy and development:  the rules and regulations for climate change mitigation 
projects in developing countries that are sponsored by industrialized countries.  
This is a very narrow and specific area covered by the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
Before investigating specific aspects of the dynamic process that occurs during 
institutional change, the differing states of structure had to be established.  I 
therefore devised two governance models (1992 and 1997) that define the 
organizational interactions set up to facilitate the transfer of climate-friendly 
technology into developing countries.  The two models are based on the United 
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed in 1992, 
and its Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, with their respective official 
documentation as well as secondary literature.  I was able to interpret the 
structures of technology transfer through my experience as a participant observer 
at the UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn, Germany, where I assisted in the 
implementation of the Convention as well as the documentation of rules and 
regulation during five international climate change conferences between 2000 
and 2003.  I presented my evolving models to a focus group of United Nations 
professional staff in 2003 who helped me refine my interpretation of the treaties 
in respect to the governance of technology transfer. Figure 1 and 2 below are 
representation of the models developed in this process. 
   
The institutional change that became apparent in the models was confirmed by 
the results of semi-structured interviews of ten senior policy makers from 
countries representing geographical diversity in June 2003.  The interviews also 
allowed me to better understand the changing power relations between actors.  
The policy makers were asked about their country’s past, present and future 
position on the two technology transfer models, i.e. the GEF model and the 
market based mechanism (CDM) model.  
 
The organizations in the organizational field were classified into six groups:  the 
official designations of Annex I and Non-Annex I refer to the UNFCCC document 
where industrialized countries (including economies in transition such as Russia) 
are listed in Annex I.  The remaining actors were classified as intergovernmental 
organizations (e.g. UNFCCC, World Bank), not-for-profit organizations that are 
directly affiliated neither with the private sector nor any government (e.g. 
Greenpeace, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), private sector 
organizations and affiliations (e.g. Shell, Business Council for Sustainable 
Energy) and the organizations acting as Designated Operational Entities 
described in the Kyoto Protocol.  The table of power relations (Table 1) was 
constructed by determining the role of each type of organization in each of the 
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institutional frameworks.  The interests of the category of organization were 
extrapolated from secondary data and websites of organizations in the respective 
groups.  
 
Institutional change in the transfer of climate change mitigation technology 
 
Traditional model:  Aid  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a 
legally binding treaty which seeks to address both the causes and adverse 
effects of climate change.  It was signed in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and 
came into force on 21 March 1994.  It currently has 188 member states.  The 
treaty has the "ultimate objective" of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases (GHG) at safe levels (Article 2, UNFCCC). To achieve this 
objective, all countries have a general commitment to address climate change, 
adapt to its effects, and report on the action they are taking to implement the 
Convention (Article 4, UNFCCC). The Convention then divides countries into two 
groups: those listed in its Annex I (known as "Annex I Parties") and those that are 
not named in this Annex (so-called "non-Annex I Parties").  
 
The countries listed in Annex I of the Convention are industrialized countries 
including economies in transition that have historically contributed the most to 
climate change. Their per capita emissions are higher than those of most 
developing countries and they have greater financial and institutional capacity to 
address the problem of climate change. The principles of equity and "common 
but differentiated responsibilities" enshrined in the Convention (Article 4.1) 
therefore require these Parties to take the lead in modifying longer-term trends in 
emissions.  
 
Working in line with these considerations, a funding mechanism was required to 
sponsor climate change mitigation projects in developing countries.  These 
projects may embrace renewable energy technologies, such as wind power or 
Global Climate Change Policy  9 
solar power, or help make existing facilities more efficient and cleaner.  They 
may be large energy projects such as a hydro dam or small local projects such 
as natural gas powered buses in urban centers.  The funding mechanism that 
was chosen to coordinate these kinds of projects was the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) which was set up by the World Bank as a pilot project in 1991 and 
restructured in 1994 to be governed by an assembly and a council.  Since 1991, 
this agency has allocated $4 billion in grants and leveraged an additional $12 
billion in co-financing from other sources to support more than 1000 projects in 
the area of climate change, biodiversity loss, degradation of international waters, 
ozone depletion, land degradation, and persistent organic pollutants.  The grants 
come from over 30 donor nations and are transferred to over 140 developing 
countries.  GEF aims to work in partnership with the private sector, NGOs and 
international institutions to address complex environmental issues while 
supporting national sustainable development initiatives.  The UN Development 
Program (UNDP), the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Bank as 
well as regional development banks implement the projects on the behalf of the 
GEF. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the funding process of a GEF sponsored climate change 
mitigation project.   I choose to call the overarching institution ‘aid’ because donor 
countries submit funds to intergovernmental agencies that in turn coordinate 
projects in developing countries.  Furthermore, the UNFCCC implies a concern 
for equity between industrialized countries that have caused most of the 
atmospheric greenhouse gases and the developing countries that are vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change (Michaelowa, 2000).  The UNFCCC therefore 
aims at the distribution of the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change.  
Some practitioners may prefer to call the model ‘development cooperation’ to 
differentiate this effort from the stigmatized term ‘foreign aid’.  
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Figure 1:  Institution ‘aid’ under the UNFCCC 
 
The governments of the global North (Annex I Parties) and the global South 
(Non-Annex I Parties) have together negotiated the UNFCCC.  As discussed 
earlier, the funding mechanism under the UNFCCC is the GEF which operates in 
cooperation with the World Bank, UNDP and UNEP.  The latter organizations are 
the ones that actually execute the climate change mitigation projects in the 
South.   
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In summary, the North donates the money to operate the UNFCCC secretariat, 
the GEF secretariat and other intergovernmental organizations as well as the 
money needed to set up climate change mitigation projects in countries of the 
South.  The UNFCCC legislates which projects are appropriate, the GEF selects 
project ideas offered by a government of the South, and coordinates the design 
and implementation of it.  The World Bank, UNEP and UNDP execute projects 
that have been approved by the UNFCCC and GEF.  The countries of the South 
host the projects and generate new project ideas. 
 
Emerging model:  Investment 
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change strengthens the international response to climate change. Adopted by 
consensus in 1997, it commits Annex I Parties to individual, legally-binding 
targets to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, adding up to a total cut 
of at least 5% from 1990 levels in the period 2008-2012.  Since the impact of 
climate change is not easily quantifiable because of the time lag and uncertain 
impact, the setting of targets was a political decision, battled out between 
economic and environmental interests (Michaelowa, 2000).  It is not based on 
scientific knowledge about safe levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
and targets are not calculated according to a set formula.  This made it easier to 
reach consensus at the time but complicates the setting of targets for the second 
commitment period.  Currently, 164 Parties have ratified the Kyoto Protocol 
including almost 40 Annex I Parties (industrialized countries) that have taken on 
emission reduction targets.  The Protocol has come into effect on 16 February 
2005. 
 
Countries will have a certain degree of flexibility in how they make and measure 
their emissions reductions. In particular, an international emissions trading 
regime will be established according to Article 17 of the Protocol allowing 
industrialized countries to buy and sell emissions credits amongst themselves. 
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They will also be able to acquire ‘emission reduction units’ by financing certain 
kinds of emission reducing projects in other developed countries that would not 
have otherwise occurred.  This is regulated in Article 6 of the Protocol and called 
the Joint Implementation (JI).  In addition, a Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) (Article 12 of the Protocol) will enable industrialized countries to finance 
emission reduction projects in developing countries that would not have 
otherwise occurred and to receive credit for doing so. The three innovative 
mechanisms, emissions trading, JI and CDM, are designed to help Annex I 
Parties reduce the costs of meeting their emissions targets by achieving or 
acquiring reductions more cheaply in other countries than at home.  It is 
considered the least cost option.  On a global playing field, emission reductions 
in other countries contribute just as much to the overall global reduction of GHG 
emissions.  Therefore, a joint effort by Annex I countries (JI) or an investment by 
an Annex I country supporting a project in the developing world (CDM) will 
reduce emissions on a global scale at the lowest cost to governments, 
businesses and consumers in the industrialized country.  It can be argued, 
however, that these measures delay the economic transition of industrialized 
countries themselves to a carbon-constrained future.  
 
In this paper, I deal with the institutional framework of the CDM.  This mechanism 
is a novel framework for climate change mitigation projects in developing 
countries.  Its institutional framework competes with the institutional framework of 
the GEF-coordinated projects in Figure 1.  I call the model that the CDM operates 
under ‘investment’.  Non-governmental organizations are encouraged to design 
and implement a climate change mitigation project.  Except for the UNFCCC 
secretariat and the KP executive board, no further involvement of 
intergovernmental organizations is required.  The operational guidelines for the 
CDM that have been established so far are depicted in Figure 2.  Once it 
functions fully, it will be self-contained and funds for its operations will be self-
generated. 
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Figure 2:  Institution ‘investment’ under the Kyoto Protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the investment model, project ideas can be generated by a government of the 
North or South, as well as by a non-government organization, such as a 
corporation or not-for-profit organization (NGO).  The proposals are examined by 
the designated operational entity (DOE) and passed on to the CDM Executive 
Board.  The latter legislates, validates and registers climate change mitigation 
projects.  If the project is approved, it will be implemented by a corporation or 
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NGO of the North or South.  The DOE continually verifies that the project is 
operating under its initial mandate.  When the project is completed, the DOE and 
the CDM Executive Board validate its contribution to reducing greenhouse gases 
and offers the country of the North a Certified Emission Reduction certificate.  
The government of the North has thus an incentive to support the organization 
that is operating the project in the South.  It will do so through tax incentives or 
direct facilitation of the project.  The government of the South approves the 
project and hosts it within its borders. 
 
Discussion 
 
The policy changes in the climate change mitigation field are an account of the 
emergence of a competing proto-institution.  Lawrence, Hardy and Phillips 
describe a proto-institution as “institutions in the making: they have the potential 
to become full-fledged institutions if social processes develop that entrench them 
and they are diffused throughout an institutional field” (2002: 283).  The institution 
of ‘investment’ in the international climate change mitigation regime is in the 
initial phase of institutionalization.  The actors are moving to turning this model 
into reality.  This proto-institution will be competing for resources against the 
traditional institution of ‘aid’ that was outlined in Figure 1.  How did this change 
come about?  Institutional theory can help us recognize that institutional change 
is underway, but the notion of power needs to be considered when discussing 
how the change came about.  Institutional theory can therefore be seen as a road 
map of institutional change.  Analysing evolving power differentials, however, is 
required in order to understand the traffic as well as road blocks and diversions.   
 
Transformation 
The brief account of the climate change models clearly indicates that power is 
shifting between the actors in this organizational field.  Under the institution ‘aid’, 
the GEF has immense power over other actors by choosing and verifying 
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projects.  Its implementation agency (World Bank, UNDP or UNEP) is a powerful 
actor as well, because it turns the plans into action and offers the funds that it 
deems necessary.  Surprisingly, these two powerful actors have effectively been 
wiped off the organizational landscape in the proto-institution of ‘investment’.  
Instead, formerly secondary actors have potentially become more powerful: 
corporations and NGOs, actually any organization can now assume the role of 
these intergovernmental organizations in designing and implementing a climate 
change mitigation project.   
 
At the time of the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, it was not clear whether a 
market-based mechanism, such as the CDM, would become the dominant way of 
setting up climate-friendly technology projects in developing countries.  The 
mechanism had been defined very vaguely and was still to be developed further 
by policy makers.  Until the ratification of the Protocol by Russia in November 
2004, almost 7 years after its signing, there was much uncertainty about the 
treaty’s future.   
 
Institutional theory as a guide for recognizing institutional change 
Dacin, Goodstein and Scott (2002) explore four ways an organizational field can 
be transformed.  All four indicators of institutional change are present in the case 
study outlined above.  Their first indicator relates to changes in the relationships 
between existing organizations.  In the climate change policy context, 
organizations that still remain in the institutional framework now relate to each 
other in different patterns.  For example, a government of the North can now 
choose a project directly that it intends to financially support.  The second 
indicator deals with modifications of the boundaries of existing organizations.   In 
the CDM framework, many organizations can now propose projects that were not 
able to do so earlier.  The third indicator concerns changes in the make up of the 
organizational field with new actors entering.  It has already been mentioned that 
the GEF and its implementing agencies have lost their position whereas new 
organizations, such as the DOE, have emerged in the organizational field.  The 
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final indicator of institutional change, alterations of the field’s boundaries and 
changes in the governance structures in an organizational field, is also present in 
our case study.  The organizational field now involves actors directly which were 
only side players in the traditional model, such as corporations and NGOs.  
Clearly, the patterns of interaction have changed. 
 
When further considering the transformation of the organizational field, two 
peculiar characteristics of the proto-institution become apparent.  Firstly, 
although the proto-institution is designed to compete with the traditional 
institution, the latter continues to exist and progress.  Indeed, the GEF has made 
several modifications to its project policies (Global Environment Facility 2002) to 
meet demands made by governments from both the North and South.  Also, 
since the administration of the United States of America has declared its refusal 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the GEF funding mechanism will continue to be a 
vehicle for United States funding. We can therefore not call this transformation a 
deinstitutionalization, preinstitutionalization or reinstitutionalization.  The stages 
of institutional change developed by Greenwood et al. (2002) therefore do not 
apply to this case. 
 
Secondly, despite the observation that the issue underlying this organizational 
field (Hoffman 1999) continues to be international climate change mitigation, the 
shared meaning of this issue has changed fundamentally.  It is for this reason 
that institutional change is evident.  Zilber demonstrates the importance of the 
interpretation of meaning for any discussion on institutional change.  
“Institutionalized meanings should be analyzed not only as qualities of actions 
and structures, but also as the cognitive process of interpreting actions and 
structures – as shared and […] contested cognitive models” (2002: 236).  She 
goes on to claim that an individual’s interpretations of meaning can be seen as 
the social actions that create, reproduce and change institutions.  The institution 
‘aid’ has spun off a competing proto-institution that incorporates modified power 
relations between existing actors as well as new actors.  However, most 
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importantly, the proto-institution brought about a change in meaning:  the 
UNFCCC implied that countries of the North admit to greater responsibility in 
causing climate change through industrial processes and wish to help developing 
countries leapfrog traditional technology choices in order to avoid duplicating the 
high emission models of industrialization.  This is what I call the institution of ‘aid’.  
The Kyoto Protocol on the other hand facilitates more cost-effective climate 
change mitigation projects in developing countries as a mechanism for 
industrialized countries to get around cutting emissions in their own backyard.  
This is what I call the institution of ‘investment’.  The balance between equity 
consideration and efficiency considerations has shifted.  We have thus moved to 
a change in meaning of the action and structure.  Zilber emphasizes “meaning 
and interpretation as parts of the medium through which institutional power 
struggles and relations take place” (2002: 236).   
 
Shifting power 
The question remains how this dramatic shift in the institutional framework could 
have come about.  To shed some light on this matter, the notion of power has to 
be introduced.  Power tactics are implemented to promote changes that are 
viewed by the actor as in their own interest (Bacharach and Lawler 1998).  The 
next step is thus to analyze the actor’s potential interests.  Power is not inherent 
in an actor; rather, it lies in specific social relationships with other actors (Pfeffer, 
1981).  Therefore, the kind of institutional pressures that actors can exercise on 
the process of institutionalization should be discussed.  Lastly, we can compare 
power potentials to the emerging structure of the proto-institution in order to infer 
which players have been successful in realizing their interest. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse all aspects of the relations 
between players in the climate change mitigation field.  I have instead compiled 
the most prominent organizational interests (incorporating the discussion by 
Greiner, 2000) and power potentials in Table 1.  Power relations have indeed 
changed and the emergence of the proto-institution means an increase of 
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institutionalized power for some players and a decrease for others.  It is also 
important to note that the table only reflects the relations that are institutionalized, 
not the ones that are hidden or indirect.  These may be as important in shaping 
the policy outcomes but are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Although the interests of the organizations are diverse, they all originate in the 
drive to continue to exist.  A democratic government wants to get re-elected and 
thus has to gauge public interest in the issue as well as the interests of the 
government’s benefactors (Hertz, 2001).  A government that was not 
democratically elected needs to sustain its control over the population through 
military means and thus needs such resources at its disposal.  Governments also 
have diplomatic responsibilities and need to consider their image on the 
international stage.  In fact, a government’s position in the world economy may 
dictate which other governments can pressure it into acting in a certain way 
(Chase-Dunn, 1998).  Furthermore, an intergovernmental organization like the 
World Bank has to sustain its raison d’être and therefore needs to maintain the 
worldview that economic development is necessary but absent in many countries 
(Ferguson, 1990).   
 
 
  
 
 
  
Actors Interests in the climate change 
mitigation policy arena 
Involvement in the 
process within 
institution ‘Aid’ 
Involvement in the 
process within proto-
institution 
‘Investment’ 
Difference in influence over 
the decision making process 
due to the institutional 
change 
Annex I Countries 
(industrialized) 
-appease electorate 
-shift costs across actors, across 
voters and to distant future 
-accommodate economic interests 
-avoid normative pressure regarding 
development and environment  
legislates 
donates 
 
legislates 
may design 
selects 
may facilitate 
may receive credit 
-now able to design project 
-now able to decide on which 
specific project to support 
-may choose and support 
implementing organization 
Non-Annex I 
Countries 
(developing) 
-receive untied foreign transfer of 
funds 
-accommodate economic interests 
-meet national development goals 
 
legislates 
designs 
cooperates 
legislates 
may design 
approves 
-no longer necessary to be 
directly involved in project work 
-no longer the only actor who 
can design projects 
Inter-
Governmental 
Organizations 
(GEF, World 
Bank, UNEP, 
UNDP, UNFCCC 
bodies) 
-encourage caring for the environment 
to fulfill mandate 
-see legislation implemented 
-increase level of reliance on 
bureaucratic procedures 
 
selects 
implements 
selects 
verifies 
validates 
accredits 
-GEF and Implementing 
Agencies are no longer 
necessary in this process 
-UNFCCC bodies, such as the 
CDM Executive Board, are now 
more directly involved in the 
decision making process 
Not-For-Profit 
Organizations 
(non-industry) 
-fulfil organizational mandate, e.g. to 
defend common good 
-appease donor groups 
-receive positive press coverage 
may be indirectly 
involved in 
governmental 
process 
may design  
may implement 
may support 
-now able to design project 
-implement project 
-support project 
Corporations and 
business 
associations 
-expand markets 
-distribute risk 
-lower costs 
-gain and sustain ‘green’ image 
may be indirectly 
involved in 
governmental 
process 
may design  
may implement 
may support 
-now able to design project 
-implement a project 
-support project 
Designated 
Operational 
Entities 
-increase level of involvement in 
procedures 
-good record of performance in order 
to continue to receive contracts 
N/A evaluates -involved in selecting project 
ideas 
-evaluate project progress 
Table 1:  Power potentials by actor and institution 
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Besides these general concerns for continued existence, the organizations have 
special interests in the climate change mitigation field.  These are the ones 
outlined in the first column of Table 1.  The next two columns give an account of 
the ways in which the actors can influence the process in each institutional 
framework.  The last column is a brief indication of the implications of the 
emergence of the proto-institution.  I will now go over actors listed in Table 1 in 
turn to discuss their involvement in the two models. 
 
We can infer from this table that the actors that were able to increase their 
institutional power potential through the CDM are Annex I countries, private 
sector organizations and bodies of the UNFCCC.  Annex I countries by definition 
have more resources available to them than Non-Annex I countries.  This gives 
them an advantage in the negotiations in two ways. Directly, Annex I countries 
can send larger delegations to conferences who can constantly seek advice from 
civil servant experts at home.  Non-Annex I countries can often not afford to send 
anyone and therefore only have the one delegate whose travel is funded by the 
UN.  Workshops and negotiation meetings often run simultaneously at 
conferences and thus need more than one national delegate.  Thus a 
government with more resources will be able to exert influence on more levels of 
the negotiation process.  In addition, this government receives more exposure in 
the media and may have special interest groups in tow that support its economic 
interests.   
 
In the CDM framework, countries of the North can now directly select and 
sponsor climate change mitigation projects.  They are therefore in a position to 
make geopolitical criteria part of their decision to invest.   They can also choose 
which implementing agency to support.  In the GEF process, this aspect was 
much more bureaucratised.   
 
The table indicates that Non-Annex I countries may have lost influence over the 
process of setting up mitigation projects.  They are now no longer the sole source 
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of project ideas and once a project is underway, close cooperation with the local 
government is no longer necessary, as the DOE fulfills the third party evaluation 
criteria. 
   
In fact, developing countries tried to block the CDM when it first appeared on the 
institutional landscape in 1993 (Michaelowa, 2000).  The government of Costa 
Rica was the first to switch position, which brought it much criticism but also a 
prompt reward of eight US climate change mitigation projects (Dutschke, 2000).  
This instance shows that although collaboration amongst Non-Annex I countries 
could increase their negotiating power (Lawrence et al. 2002), it is very difficult to 
negotiate as a solid entity, when the group contains over 100 countries 
representing a wide array of interests.   
 
The opposition to the CDM was based on a variety of economic, ethical and 
moral claims.  The CDM allows industrialized countries to buy their way out of 
reducing emissions in their own country by capitalizing on low-cost emission 
reduction projects in developing countries while continuing environmentally 
harmful ways of production and consumption at home.  This could effectively 
lead to a slower rate of emission-reducing technological innovation.  Developing 
countries were also concerned about the substantial power differential between 
project participants (Dubash, 1992).  A powerful investor may be able to reap 
increased profits from the project while lowering the host country’s benefits.  
Furthermore, while the developing country has less control over the actual 
project, financial support from the North may come out of the country’s 
development aid budget and in effect lower overall funding of development 
projects (Greiner, 2000).  On the other hand, however, it has been argued that 
liquidity for the financial mechanism may be enhanced by soliciting private sector 
participation (Michaelowa and Dutschke, 2000). 
 
In Table 1 the governments are divided into those that are listed under the Annex 
I of the Convention and those that are not listed there (Non-Annex I countries).  
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Of course there are other ways to classify country governments in climate 
change negotiations.  Paterson (1996) describes three dimensions that 
governments can be divided into in order to understand their bargaining position 
in global warming politics.  The first dimension of energy dependency divides 
countries into three categories:  countries that depend on energy imports, ones 
that depend on energy exports and those that have their own indigenous energy 
supply sufficiently large to support their own activities but not for export.  The 
second dimension is economic dependence and the third dimension perceived 
vulnerability to climate change, depending on the country’s ability to adapt.  
These dimensions determine whether the country is willing to act in order to 
mitigate climate change or whether the country has an interest in blocking action.  
They also demonstrate whether a country is able to act independently.  In 
addition, the consensus format used in the climate change negotiations favours 
blocking action rather than pushing for action (Wittneben et al., 2005). 
 
The decline of the GEF with its implementing agencies under the institution of 
‘investment’ may broaden the rift in power relations between the North and 
South.  These intergovernmental organizations were the medium for distributing 
donations.  However, the GEF cannot be seen as non-partisan or apolitical, and 
is affected by an inherent mistrust of the World Bank by developing nations 
(Paterson, 1996). The GEF has often been called inefficient by both the North 
and the South, despite the fact that it has received only meagre funding over the 
years considering the immense task it has been assigned  (Michaelowa, 2000).   
 
Another set of actors in the climate change policy field are corporations. Policy 
decisions concerning fossil fuel production and consumption will directly impact 
operations of oil companies.  Levy and Kolk (2002) demonstrate that the strategic 
choices of oil industry giants have been diverse: Exxon has chosen to assertively 
resist responding to the threat of climate change and Texaco has avoided 
responding whereas the European oil giants BP and Shell have had a proactive 
stance on climate change action.  Nevertheless, their strategies have recently 
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converged with Exxon investing in fuel cell technology and carbon sequestration 
and Shell and BP continuing to direct the majority of their investments into fossil 
fuel exploitation.   
 
Throughout the negotiation process, industry lobby groups have ensured access 
to delegates and the press, industry representatives hold seminars, distribute 
leaflets and discussion pieces to delegates during conferences and consult 
delegates on the negotiation process upon request.  As can be seen on Table 1, 
the CDM has effectively moved these organizations from behind their information 
booths to the floodlights of the center stage.  Although they will not be able to 
negotiate legislation, they can now suggest projects, implement projects and 
invest in projects that they see worthwhile in return for emission reduction credits.    
 
Could not the same benefit accrue to the non-industry not-for-profits?  Not 
exactly.  Although they can also be said to have moved from the corridors to 
center stage, they may not have the resources available to realize a project that 
they approve of and may not have the means to push a project idea through the 
bureaucracy of the UN or rally support from an Annex I government.  Their 
projects are often not large enough to qualify as a CDM project or to absorb the 
required transaction costs to turn a project into a CDM project. NGOs actually are 
well positioned to take on CDM projects:  they are very efficient information 
distributors, they are experienced in capacity building, have lower labour costs 
and enjoy trusting relationships with the locals (Michaelowa, 2000).  However, 
the tax incentive schemes that may be offered by a government of the North do 
not work for NGOs because they usually do not pay taxes.  Instead, the 
government would have to facilitate a project through direct financial support, 
which may not be as politically viable with the electorate (Michaelowa, 2000). 
 
Corporations are much more likely to seize the opportunities that the CDM 
brings.  Not-for-profits will be able to participate, but likely not to the same 
degree. Considering that the CDM operates under the institution of ‘investment’, 
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corporations have the advantage that they are very comfortable interacting under 
this institution.  The knowledge and skill set that business corporations 
encompass are a very close fit with the institution.  The shift towards this 
institutional arrangement gives them an advantage over non-profits, 
intergovernmental as well as public organizations.  In fact, they are experts in this 
institution that will be consulted and relied upon in the setting up of the 
governance structure. 
 
Notice that the interests of all organizations include neither the protection of the 
earth’s climate nor the efficiency of abatement strategies (Greiner, 2000).  These 
become relevant issues only if they are connected to the actor’s interests.  For 
example, countries dependent on energy imports will call for a rapid development 
of renewable energy options, as this will ease their geopolitical dependencies.  
 
Conclusion and future research 
 
Overall, it can be observed that a competing proto-institution of ‘investment’ has 
emerged from the traditional institution of ‘aid’ in international climate change 
mitigation funding.  The shift from interpreting climate change mitigation projects 
in developing countries as political ‘aid’ to economic ‘investment’ may be 
attributed to the meaning shared by the actors that have benefited most from this 
power struggle in the policy arena: industrialized countries as well as large 
corporations. Economic forces seem to be favored by their constituents over 
political ones.  It has been observed that the private sector is becoming more 
successful in exerting institutional pressure in the policy arena (Hertz, 2001).  
This examination of institutional change in the policy dimension shows that 
regulatory innovation is not necessarily based on a level playing field between 
unequal actors (Michaelowa and Dutschke, 2000).  Instead, it resembles more an 
institutional war where actors gain and lose interorganizational power.   
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An analysis of the changing structure shows that the newly established Kyoto 
Protocol not only changes the way the transfer of climate-friendly technology is 
governed, but also the underlying logic of the social interaction. The 
entrenchment of the market-based logic has thus been established in an 
environmental treaty.  In addition, different actors become pivotal in the new 
institutional structure.  The make-up of the institutional field in terms of its actors, 
changes instantly as certain actors gain and lose influence with the changing 
institutional logic and structure.   
 
It becomes clear then that the structure, logic and actors that make up the 
organizational field as described by Scott (1995) are so closely intertwined and 
interdependent that one cannot be examined without the other two.  In fact, each 
dimension reflects the other two.  If an actor did not share the same institutional 
logic as the others in the organizational field, it would not be a significant actor or 
considered within the organizational field by definition.  If an institutional logic 
would not be underlying an institutional structure, this structure would not make 
sense to the social agents in the organizational field.  If a structure were not 
accepted by the actors in an organizational field, it would not be the governance 
pattern of the social interactions.   
 
This paper has shed some light on the process of institutional change.  
Institutional theory aided in the examination of the organizational field and helped 
determine whether institutional change indeed took place.  This was 
accomplished by using the forms of transformation outlined by Dacin and 
colleagues (2002) which are a useful tool to understand the extent of the 
institutional change.  Furthermore, the discussion surrounding a proto-institution 
by Lawrence and colleagues (2002) aids the understanding of the evolution of 
new patterns of interaction.  It was recognized, however, that institutional theory 
alone cannot explain institutional change.  The notion of power was necessary in 
order to comprehend how actors relate to each other in the traditional and the 
new pattern of interactions.  We can only arrive at a more complete 
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understanding of institutional change once we understand how power 
differentials in an organizational field are affected.  The notion of power can 
therefore inform us about how the institutional change has affected the power 
positions of the actors.  We cannot assume, however, that a better power 
position necessarily means that this actor was instrumental in bringing about the 
change.  Instead, it is pertinent to develop a dynamic dimension of institutional 
theory that can help observe the changes as they are occurring.  In order to 
accomplish this, further theoretical development is needed. 
 
Although this paper edges towards developing a dynamic model of institutional 
change that takes power positions into account, the concept of power has been 
presented in a simplified manner in order to make the institutional changes 
clearly visible.  A more complex analysis of the power dimensions would add to 
the understanding of the change processes.  Also, the focus of the paper has 
been on the policy perspective of climate change mitigation, disregarding the 
influence of actors that are not present at the international negotiations.  
Connecting this policy perspective to a wider society perspective as well as a 
narrower local perspective can add to the insights gained in this study.  The 
paper is also limited in that it takes the existing influential organizations for 
granted.  Further analysis could critically examine the role of the nation state or 
the lobbying efforts of firms and environmental groups. 
 
Despite these limitations, the study indicates that an analysis of the institutional 
changes would have been incomplete without examining the power struggles that 
are played out in this policy arena.  The next step is to analyze the power 
relations of these and other organizations in the project arena.  How do 
organizations cope with the efficiency demands of the project while keeping the 
ceremonial front established in the policy arena?  According to Meyer and Rowan 
(1977), we should find much more decoupling and reliance on trust in the ‘aid’ 
institution than in the proto-institution ‘investment’.   Is technological innovation 
more likely to occur in one model rather than the other or do projects under either 
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institution resemble each other quite extensively despite such a differing 
institutional framework?  Are the power differentials similar in the project arena 
as in the policy arena or are some organizations able to exert more power?  
Since the aim of the climate change mitigation negotiations is to lower emissions, 
having a closer look at the power relations in the project arena is critical.  How is 
the environment faring under the proto-institution?  It has been argued that the 
lengthy discussions surrounding the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms have been used 
to divert attention away from developing strategies to reduce emissions 
(Michaelowa and Dutschke, 2000).  Clearly, an examination of the power 
struggles in the project arena is necessary to answer these questions. 
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